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RIO VISTA LIMITED, a Utah
Corporation dba MOAB U-SERVE
aka STARS FOOD STORE, LA SAL OIL
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, dba
GORDON'S SINCLAIR, STATE OF UTAH
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE
and JOHN DOES I-X,
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930612-CA

Priority 15

]
]

Defendants/Appellees.

NOTICE OF ERRATA TO REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Please take notice that the Appellant's reply brief filed on
February 17, 1994, mistakenly contains a draft version of page five
(5) which was inadvertantly bound with the brief in place of the
final version which should have been included.

The correct version

of page five (5) is attached hereto and should be substituted in
place of the page five (5) presently bound in the brief.
Dated and signed this 18th day of February, 1994.

Court. (R.221-239).

With clear evidence before the court that

Appellant had not been ignoring the proceeding, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to dismiss this action, and a
fortiori to do so with prejudice.
Hartford Leasing pursued it's causes of action by fighting
battles on several fronts.

Hartford worked to hold on to the

building, investigate and gather evidence, attempt to negotiate a
resolution of the dispute, and to keep attorneys employed and
working on the case. The simple statement in Appellee's brief that
all Hartford did was to try to retain an attorney is a gross over
simplification and ignores the reality that litigation is much more
than what appears of record on the court's docket.
From December of 1990 to the present Hartford fought to retain
ownership of the building (which was then vacant as a result of
rumors of a gas plume which had alledgedly permeated the ground
beneath it) . The damage from this gas spill was chargeable to the
negligence of one or all of the Appellees, or in the alternative,
to the State of Utah if it improperly vacated the building contrary
to it's lease obligations. Since no revenue was flowing to pay the
underlying indebtedness the debtor was forced to mitigate its
damages through negotiations.

Attorney Steven Call negotiated

additional time and terms of repayment on the million dollar debt.
(R. 236-237) .

Mr. Call also negotiated with the State concerning

settlement of the claims arising out of the it's vacation of the
building as late as July 31, 1992.
Following

(R. 238).

the close of its bankruptcy, Hartford Leasing
5
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

following

rules

and

statutes

are

determinative

with

respect to some of the issues raised by Hartford Leasing and are
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant concurs in the briefs of the Appellees' that the
correct

standard of review for Appellant's

correction of error standard.
a

correction

of

error

sixth issue is the

However, whether this Court applies

standard

or

reviews

the

Trial

Court's

conclusions as a matter of law, no deference should be paid to the
interpretation

of

the

statute

by

the

Trial

Court.

Savage

Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 666-65

(Utah

1991) .
ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
WHERE HARTFORD LEASING PURSUED THIS ACTION CONTINUOUSLY
FROM THE DATE OF FILING THE INITIAL COMPLAINT.

Appellant Hartford Leasing continuously and diligently pursued
this action from the date the initial Complaint was filed to the
date the Trial Court dismissed this action with prejudice.
actions taken by Hartford
categories
attorneys;
damages;

which
(b)

include:

efforts

to

Leasing can be segregated
(a) efforts
salvage

(c) informal discovery; and

settlement.

the

made

to

building

into four

retain
and

The

several
mitigate

(d) efforts to negotiate a

These efforts were all clearly defined in the record

before the lower court and are a part of the record before this
4

Court.

(R.221-239).

With clear evidence before the court that

Appellant had not been ignoring the proceeding, it was an abuse of
discretion

for the trial court to dismiss

this action, and a

fortiori to do so with prejudice.
The efforts of Appellant to retain and Appellant Hartford
Leasing diligently pursued this action by seeking out and obtaining
governmental records concerning investigations into the presence of
a gasoline plume on Hartford Leasing's property.

(R. 221-239).

Contrary to Appellee Rio Vista's argument and characterization (Rio
Vista

Brief, p.

7 ) , Appellant

Hartford Leasing

did more

from

December 1990 to the present than merely attempt to obtain legal
counsel.
From December of 1990 to the present, Hartford vigorously
attempted

to

retain

ownership

of

the

building,

which

was

practically rendered worthless as a result of the damages alleged
by

the

Through

Plaintiff

to be

negotiations

chargeable

with

the

to the Appellees' conduct.

mortgage

holder

and

Hartford

Leasing's newly retained attorney Steven Call of Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker negotiated additional time and terms of repayment on a
million dollar debt with no cash flowing from the leasehold tenancy
of the State of Utah.

(R. 236-237) .

Attorney Call was in

communication with Attorney Clegg for Appellee State concerning the
State's vacation of the building as late as July 31, 1992.
238) .

(R.

Appellant also filed and pursued reorganization of its

financial situation in United States Bankruptcy Court.
Following

the

close

of

its
5

bankruptcy,

Hartford

Leasing

actively sought out new counsel to represent its interests in this
action.
began

Appellant retained . counsel (Watkiss & Saperstein), who

investigating

the matter seriously

and billed Hartford

Leasing $8,420.00, but was forced to withdraw when a conflict of
interest

was discovered

which prevented

their being

able to

continue their representation of Hartford Leasing in this case.
(R. 236-237) . Hartford Leasing thereupon retained Steven Call of
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker.

(R. 235-238) .

Finally, in December of

1992 Hartford Leasing consulted with their present counsel and
entered into a contract with him to represent their interest on a
contingency fee basis. (R. 238).
All of the above efforts through counsel were going on
simultaneously

while

Appellant

continued

to

gather

evidence

informally, and to participate as an active non-party observer of
the litigation that was progressing among the Defendants themselves
over substantially the same issues.

Hartford was in the enviable

position of being able to claim that one of the three defendants
was the cause of its damages while the defendants themselves were
involved in separate but related litigation to decide who among
them was responsible for the gas plume, and therefore the cleanup
costs associated therewith.

The evidence and proof submitted in

that litigation was all directly applicable to its case.

It was

prudent for Hartford to make use of the development of those cases.
Contrary to the position urged by the Appellees, Appellant Hartford
Leasing diligently prepared its case. The Trial Court, by ignoring
the fact that these efforts were proceeding outside it's docket
6

record,

abused

its

discretion

in

dismissing

this

case

with

prejudice.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THIS
ACTION BECAUSE NEW COUNSEL HAD BEEN RETAINED WHO
REACTIVATED THIS CASE.

The Trial * Court abused its discretion by dismissing this
action

because

Appellant

reactivated this case.

had

obtained

new

counsel

who

had

Therefore, this Court should reverse the

trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.
The law in this state is clear that it is an abuse of
discretion to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute where a party
has retained new counsel who has reactivated the case.

This is

clearly the holding in Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368,
1370 (Utah 1977) . In Johnson, the court found it to be an abuse of
discretion to dismiss the action where "new counsel caused the case
to be activated."

Johnson at 1370.

Immediately preceding the dismissal of this case, new counsel
for Hartford Leasing had reactivated the case.

In Johnson, the

only action taken by new counsel prior to filing the motions was to
file a notice of appearance.

In the present case, new counsel for

Hartford Leasing, in fulfilling his due diligence obligations as an
attorney, went to the Court in Moab and inspected the building just
days prior to both the filing of his Notice of Appearance and
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss.

New counsel for Hartford Leasing

was clearly in the process of reactivating this case prior to the
Appellees' filing of their Motions to dismiss. Because new counsel
was reactivating this case, the trial court abused its discretion
7

in dismissing this action.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THIS
ACTION WITHOUT GIVING ANY PRIOR WARNING OR DIRECTION TO
HARTFORD LEASING TO PROSECUTE THIS ACTION OR FACE
DISMISSAL.
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this
action without giving any prior warning or direction to Hartford
Leasing to either prosecute this action or face the possibility of
dismissal.

In Country Meadows v. Utah Department of Health, 851

P.2d 1212 (Ut. App. 1993), this Court, in discussing the exercise
of a Trial Court's discretion in dismissing an action, stated
Therefore, within the above parameters, a trial court retains
discretion to dismiss an action xif a party fails to move
forward according to the rules and the directions of the
court, without justifiable excuse.7
Country Meadows at 1215 quoting Westing-house Electric Supply Co. v.
Paul

W.

Larsen

Contractor,

1975) [emphasis added] .

Inc.,

544

P.2d

876,

879

(Utah

Thus, under Country Meadows, a Court has

the right to exercise its discretion in dismissing an action if the
party has both ignored the rules and the directions of the Court.
This holding, setting forth the standard in the conjunctive,
implies that the Court has an affirmative duty to direct a litigant
that unless action is taken, the case will be dismissed.

The use

of the conjunctive term "and" in this holding leaves no doubt of
the intent of the appellate court in making this ruling.

Such a

reading comports with Utah law stating that dismissal is a severe
sanction.

Country Meadows at 1215. This is especially true where

it is clear that lesser sanctions are available to the court, such
as imposing costs and fees upon the party against whom such a
8

motion has been filed.
In the present

case, the Trial

Court

did not

issue

any

warnings or other directions to Hartford Leasing to pursue its
action. Applying the standard set forth in Country Meadows. we are
left to conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion by
failing to warn or otherwise direct Hartford Leasing to pursue its
action or face dismissal.
IV.

HARTFORD LEASING DID NOT WAIVE ITS REQUEST FOR A HEARING
ON THE APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS. THE TRIAL COURT'S
RENDERING OF A DECISION ON THESE MOTIONS WITHOUT HOLDING
A HEARING OR RULING ON THE REQUEST FOR A HEARING VIOLATED
HARTFORD LEASING'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

The Trial Court abused its discretion by rendering a decision
of the Appellees' motions to dismiss without holding a hearing as
requested by Appellant Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Hartford Leasing did not

waive its right to such a hearing when it filed its Notice to
Submit for Decision pursuant to that same rule.

Finally, not only

did the trial court abuse its discretion by rendering a decision on
these motions without holding a hearing, such action constitutes a
violation of Hartford Leasing's constitutional right to due process
of law.
The

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

by

rendering

its

decision on the Appellees' motions to dismiss without holding a
hearing as requested by Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Under this rule, when a

party requests a hearing, the trial court must grant such hearing
unless it finds that
9

(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b)
that the dispositive issues governing the granting or denial
of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
Rule 4-501(3) (c) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration

(1993).

Thus, under the rule, the trial court must make findings that one
of the two afore stated exceptions applies.

In the present case,

the trial court did not make such findings.

Therefore, the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to follow Rule 4-501(3) (c)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Appellant
Hartford Leasing's Notice to Submit for Decision constituted a
waiver of its requests and right to a hearing under Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Subsection (3) (f) of

this rule states, "If no written request for a hearing is made at
the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on
the motion shall be deemed waived." Rule 4-501(3) (f) , Utah Code of
Judicial Administration

(1993).

The rule expressly contains a

waiver provision which is applicable only where the parties fail to
make such a request in their principal memoranda.

In the present

case, Appellant made a request for a hearing on the Appellees'
motions to dismiss in it principal memoranda.

(R. 112) . Moreover

Appellant Hartford Leasing did not expressly waive its right to the
hearing.
Appellant Hartford Leasing argues that it did not waive its
right to a hearing by filing its Notice to Submit for decision.
Hartford Leasing's filing of a Notice to Submit for Decision was
not a "waiver" as defined by Utah case law, because Hartford
10

Leasing did not intend to relinquish its right to the requested
hearing.

"Waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a

known right." United Park City Mines v. Greater Park City Co. , 220
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1993) . Hartford Leasing was aware that
it had a right to a hearing which is why it requested such a
hearing. However, Hartford Leasing was not aware nor did it intend
that by requesting that the matter be submitted to the court that
this act would be construed as a waiver.

Since the court had to

rule to grant a hearing the notice to submit was simply requesting
the court to do so.
The trial court abused its discretion by stating that Hartford
Leasing7s Notice to Submit for Decision constituted a waiver of its
earlier request for a hearing.

Rule 4-501(1) (d) states

(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of
the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party
may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate
written pleading and captioned, "Notice to Submit for
Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of
mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the
motion will not be submitted for decision.
Rule 4-501(1) (d) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1993) . The
clear purpose of this rule is to inform the court that all of the
memoranda concerning the issue have been or should have been filed
and that the matter is ready for the court's further consideration.
It does not alleviate the requirement that the Court hold a hearing
if one has been so requested pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(f) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Thus, because Hartford

Leasing did nothing more than inform the Court, pursuant to its own
rule, that all of the memoranda had been or should have been
11

submitted, and because Hartford Leasing had requested a hearing in
its principal memorandum, the trial court abused its discretion by
ruling that Hartford Leasing had waived its right to the requested
hearing.
The trial court's failure to hold the request hearing violated
Hartford Leasing's right to due process under the law.

The Utah

Supreme Court, in Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 758 (Utah
1990), in discussing Rule 4-501's requirement that memorandum be
served on the opposing party at least ten days prior to the holding
of any hearing on the matter, stated,
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness
. . . Many cases have held that where notice is ambiguous or
inadequate to inform a party of the nature of a proceeding
against him or not given sufficiently in advance of the
proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due
process.
Cornish Town at 756 citing to Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1211-1212 (Utah 1983)[emphasis added; other citations on violation
of due process footnoted at footnote No. 5 in Cornish Town at 756
omitted] . It is axiomatic that denying a party the opportunity to
be heard, especially when that party has requested that opportunity
pursuant to the Court's own rules, is a violation of due process
which is more egregious than merely given that party inadequate
time to properly prepare. Thus, because the trial court abused its
discretion by rendering a decision of the Appellees' motions to
dismiss without holding

a hearing

thereby violating Hartford

Leasing7s right to due process, this Court should remand this
action to the trial court for further proceedings.
12

V.

THE RECORD FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL CONSTITUTES ALL OF
THE RECORD TRANSMITTED TO THIS COURT BY THE LOWER COURT.

The record*for purposes of this appeal is the entire record as
prepared by the lower court and transmitted to this Court
purposes of this appeal.

for

The Appellees' arguments that this Court

should disregard those portions of the record flies in the face of
both the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Case law.
Thus, this Court should consider the entire record as prepared by
the lower court for purposes of this appeal.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure clearly define what the
record is for purposes of an appeal.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure defines the composition of the record on appeal
as
The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the
transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the
clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket
sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1993) . It is clear in
the present case that the record as prepared by the lower court and
transmitted to this Court includes both the Supplemental Memorandum
in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

(R. 151-162) and

Hartford Leasing's Objections to Proposed Order (R. 197-199) plus
the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Hartford
Leasing's Objections to Proposed order (R. 217-312).

Thus, these

documents are a part of the record for purposes of appeal pursuant
to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This Court should consider the entire record as prepared and
transmitted by the lower court because Hartford Leasing preserved
13

its objections below
, .

~_4

First, the trial court made a minute entry

,.eii" S

w.

i i i i )ll

i i iii<

I I i

"nothing more than a memorandum

i I i i,.ni j

"

h

H I i u i,i I i >

from which the

Hiil.

i y

I " •

findings,

conclusion? and a decree were to b e drawn and d id not constitute a
- ---

nartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. v.

Ciegg,

: —

1<„. - l* ar. 4.

7 2d 9 1 9 , 922 (Utah 1943)

Thi is, the

Judgment w^r ~ ? " f- ,-n until the court signed the order as p r e p a r e d
counse.
preserved

. . . \i

ciiate

its objections

Fi irther,

Hartford

below by filing

Leasing

its objections

properly
to the

p r o p o s e d o:i :xlei ai id :i ts basi s f IO: sa i d obje ct:i oi is :i i I 1:1: le for n:i c »f a
M e m o r a n d u m of Points a n d Authorities within the period p r e s c r i b e d
by Rule 4-504 of the U t a h Code of Judicial Administration
Hartford Leasing " s MI ij^rl. i oiir. I <» I I1

Thus,

proposed order a r ^ properly

b e f o r e this Court as a part of the record o n a p p e a l .
Finally,

the

trial

court

abused

its discretion

in Support of :"s Objections t-.: Proposed Order.

?.. 314

Rule 4-504 a n d p u r s u a n t to order of the lower court

b^ not

r:>vr

coi insel for

A p p e l l e e State w a s ordered to prepare a p r o p o s e d order b a s e d o n the
trial, court's minute entry granting A p p e l l e e ' s motions to d i s m i s s .
Pur si lant to Ri L! e 4 -5 04 of the Utah Code of J i id :i c :i a ] A dn i :i :n :i strati on,
"Notice of o b j e c t i o n s shall b e submitted to t h e court a n d counsel
within

five

days

after

service."

Jud i ci a] Mini i :i :i strat i :>i I (1 9 93)

Rule

4 -504(2),

Utah

Code of

It :i s • cl e ar from tl I = i e c o r d that

A p p e l l a n t H a r t f o r d Leasing submitted its objections to the p r o p o s e d
o r d e r as p r e s c r i b e d b y Rule 4 - 5 0 4 ( 2 ) .
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It is clear from t h e rule

that one of the purposes for its enactment was to have the court
review such objections prior to entering the final order. However,
in the present case, it is clear from the record that the lower
court refused to even consider the proposed objections.

Such a

failure to consider Hartford Leasing7s objections to the proposed
order renders this rule meaningless and is a clear abuse of
discretion.

Because the trial court abused its discretion, this

Court should remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
VI.

RULE 4-506 OPERATES AS A STAY OF
ACTION UNTIL THE REQUIRED NOTICE
THEREAFTER HAS ELAPSED. PERMITTING
ABSENCE OF SUCH NOTICE IS A CLEAR

ALL PROCEEDINGS IN AN
IS GIVEN AND THE TIME
ANY PROCEEDINGS IN THE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The trial court abused its discretion by permitting the
Appellees' to file the motions to dismiss in violation of Rule 4506.

A fortiori, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to

rule on these motions.

Thus, this Court should reverse the trial

court and remand this case for further proceedings.
The provisions of Rule 4-506 operate

as a stay in the

proceedings until the requisite notice has been given and the time
thereafter has elapsed.

Rule 4-506. in the relevant part, states

(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney,
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented
client of his responsibility to retain another attorney or
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further
proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice
shall be filed with the court and no further proceedings shall
be held in the matter until 2 0 days have elapsed from the date
of filing.
Rule 4-506(3), Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added).
Thus, the very terms of the rule itself make it clear that opposing
15

can

.-..-- ccurL no!;.: such proceedings.

discretion

for riv- trial

Utah

has
•-f*he

However

veiy

1" is

cou.v-

little

clearly an abuse ot

^ucn proceedings

case

law

interpreting

in the

:;hi3 rule,

;i

: ^iictions including Montana and \r~*- York have

:-._-.. . ... _..•- _,_ — _

.i.^d..i_:.-_

• :i^^.ai provisions.

^_ -61-40? ^f

the Montana Code Annotated states
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or ceases to
act as such, a party to an action for whom he was acting as
attorney must, before any further proceedings are had against
him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice to
appoint another attorney or appear in person,
K1

if

> ""7
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i 1

II

I!":

"I I"
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, I I
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I
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t

i"",ii
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'i i u::;
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v, Bensoi i,
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< a.oc

-I- TUT,, •%•»-!+

>» 1

2

,

n

iyiUiiLdila

"D -> y> \r

.Dcilljv

,

-C"

" D "~vi -t*-*-J-i lit *

OJL

Kuliiiuup

the Montana Supreme Court stated, "This section means

not more than it plainly states, v i s , that no proceeding may be had
agaii ist a pai: !::/;;y ,, i ::i ::: • j i ldg mei i t DII : on der c i c tl lei: ste p be taken, until
he appoints an attorney, unless the prescribed notice
given . "
lybfcii

is first

Montana Bank of Roundup v , Benson, 717 P . 2d 6, 7 (I ''!« : > r it.

In another Montana decision wherein the unrepresented party

was never notified pursuant

to §37-61 405, the Court

stated tha t :i i I tl i e a i b s e n c e o f si ich a i IC t::i : '€
virtue

of §37-61 405 , "

f icWilliams v.. Clem,

expressly

' 'tl i • a • ::«:= se :i s stayed b
743 P. 2d 5 7 7 , 586

(Mont. 198 7 ) .
: s o f N e w Yc: Q: ] :: s:i n: id ] a:t : ] y 1: I : •] • I t l ia .t wl le :i : e i lot:! c e i s ii : >t

T]

given, pursuant
stayed

until

t h e re a f t e

to New York's version
both

the notice

. . s e 1 ap s e d

of 4-506,

is giver

and :. ><•• time

N s - i 1 o :i : ] ::' s s 1 .. 11
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such action is

.- •. • i

required

If an attorney dies, becomes physically or mentally
incapacitated, or is removed, suspended or otherwise becomes
disabled at any time before judgment, no further proceedings
shall be taken in the action against the party for whom he
appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after
notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that
party either personally or in such manner as the court
directs.
New York CPLR Rule 321(c) (1993) . New York court's hold that this
section applies to cases where an attorney has withdrawn from the
case.

In re Von Barren's

(Surrogate Court 1963).

Estate,

243 N.Y.S.2d

Further, in this same case, the court held

that compliance with this rule is mandatory.
court's

interpret

this

328, 329-330

section

to

JEd. at 330. New York

function

as

a stay of

the

proceeding until such time as the required notice has been given
and thirty days thereafter have elapsed.
Company v. Dietz, 488 N.Y.S.2d

Firemen's Fund Insurance

936, 937

(A.D. 4 Dept.

1985).

Finally, in L. Johnson & Sons v. Brighton Commons, 569 N.Y.S.2d 40,
41 (A.D. 4 Dept 1991), where the lower court dismissed an action on
a motion to dismiss filed by a party who earlier had failed to
serve the notice required under CPLR 321(c), the court said, "No
notice was served upon the plaintiffs and thus the order dismissing
plaintiffs'

causes

of

action

must

be

nullified

and

the

case

restored to the court's calendar."
The Appellees' violated Rule 4-506 by initiating proceedings
against Hartford Leasing without first serving the notice to appear
or appoint new counsel required by the rule.

Appellees' argument

that somehow the notice by Hartford Leasing's withdrawing counsel
somehow relieved them of their burden to file such a notice is
untenable.

No notice of appearance was ever filed by any counsel
17

for Hartford Leasing until after Appellees' motions to dismiss were
filed.

As

such,

Appellees'

violated

the

Code

of

J udicial

Administration.
The trial court abused its discretion by violating the Utah
Code

of J i idi ::i:ii a ]

i \ < Irn :i n i 3 t r a t:i oi :i

1 e a :i : that

th € i 3 : 1 lie

operates as a sta} of airy further proceedings :i n an action until
compliance is secured.

Further, because the requirements under the

r i il e aie both p
should

be

1 i.di 1 ' ;(• "ti K"( >v "rap i iarice

permitted

Because

the

trial

court

held

further

proceedings in this action i n violation of one of i ts own rules, it
abused its discretion and this Court must remand this case bacJ c to
the trial court for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the lower court's decision granting
Appellees' motions to dismiss based not only on the Appellees'
violations of the Code of J udi cial Adi n :i nistrati :i 01 3 bi it al sc • : 11 the
repeated and serious abuses of discretion committed by the lower
- . - - T.

- -ie

lower

court

abused

its

discretion,

the

Appellant H a m o i a ^easing requests this Court to reverse the lower
Court's decision and remand this action for further proceedings.
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